Matching spatial property rights fisheries with scales of fish dispersal.
Regulation of fisheries using spatial property rights can alleviate competition for high-value patches that hinders economic efficiency in quota-based, rights-based, and open-access management programs. However, efficiency gains erode when delineation of spatial rights constitutes incomplete ownership of the resource, thereby degrading its local value and promoting overexploitation. Incomplete ownership may be particularly prevalent in the spatial management of mobile fishery species. We developed a game-theoretic bioeconomic model of spatial property rights representing territorial user rights fisheries (TURF) management of nearshore marine fish and invertebrate species with mobile adult and larval life history stages. Strategic responses by fisheries in neighboring management units result in overexploitation of the stock and reduced yields for each fishery compared with those attainable without resource mobility or with coordination or sole control in fishing effort. High dispersal potential of the larval stage, a common trait among nearshore fishery species, coupled with scaling of management units to only capture adult mobility, a common characteristic of many nearshore TURF programs, in particular substantially reduced stock levels and yields. In a case study of hypothetical TURF programs of nearshore fish and invertebrate species, management units needed to be tens of kilometers in alongshore length to minimize larval export and generate reasonable returns to fisheries. Cooperation and quota regulations represent solutions to the problem that need to be quantified in cost and integrated into the determination of the acceptability of spatial property rights management of fisheries.